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Rotary International v. Duarte: Limiting
Associational Rights to Protect Equal
Access to California Business
Establishments
The right of association implicitly guaranteed by the first
amendment' is asserted by private organizations to protect, and
thereby perpetuate, discriminatory membership practices. Fraternal
organizations face legal challenges to race and gender-based discrim-

ination under federal statutes,2 state public accommodation laws,'
and equal protection constitutional grounds. 4 Recently, legal actions
filed under state public accommodation laws have provided the courts

with new opportunities for establishing the scope of associational

1. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See L. TRuE, AimucA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-23, at 700-02 (1978) (noting that the
Supreme Court considers the freedom of association to be a preferred right derived by
implication from the express guarantees of the first amendment). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (explaining that the right of association is necessary to
make meaningful the express first amendment guarantees). The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment secures the first amendment freedoms from abridgement by the states.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495 F.2d
883, 887 (10th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (disbursement of government
funds by private entity insufficient government action to support a sex discrimination claim
under title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983); Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective
Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974) (unsuccessful race discrimination
challenge under section 1981 and section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
3. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987)
(sex discrimination policies violated a public accommodation law of California notwithstanding
the freedom of association of rotarians); Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 257 Or. 327,
551 P.2d 456 (1976) (scouting group not a business or commercial enterprise within ambit of
the Oregon Public Accommodation Act); Commonwealth v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge
No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 594 A.2d 694 (1972) (fraternal organization is a public accommodation
whose racially discriminatory guest policies are prohibited by the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act, however membership policies are distinctly private and therefore outside the scope of the
Act).
4. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, 495 F.2d at 884, 888, cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1026 (1974) (receipt of federal grants and tax benefits does not render the Jaycees an
arm of the government for purposes of an equal protection claim); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1971) (insufficient nexus between refusal to serve black patrons
and the regulation of liquor by Pennsylvania to render the discrimination a violation of equal
protection).
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rights and the role of government in eliminating sex discrimination.

The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Directorsof Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,5 prevented the Rotary International organization (Rotary International) from enforcing a gender discriminatory membership policy against Rotary Club of Duarte
(Duarte), a local affiliate of Rotary International. The Supreme Court

implemented a bifurcated approach in resolving the issue of whether
the associational rights of Rotary members are impermissibly infringed
upon by the application of the public accommodation law of Cali-

fornia.6 The law at issue, the Unruh Civil Rights Act,' prohibits
business establishments from engaging in discriminatory practices.
Rotary International revoked the charter of the Rotary Club of

Duarte after three women were admitted to Duarte in defiance of
the Rotary International male-only membership rule.9 Duarte alleged

that Rotary International and the local affiliates are businesses whose
actions are subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The trial court

found the Unruh Act inapplicable to both Duarte and Rotary International, after ruling that neither is a business establishment under
the Act. 10 Furthermore, the trial court concluded that the injunctive
relief sought by Duarte would impinge upon the fellowship of club
members and would therefore interfere with the freedom of association of Rotary members." The California Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that both Duarte and Rotary International are business
establishments within the scope of the Unruh Act.' 2 In addition, the
5. 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
6. Id. at 1945.
7. CAL. Crv. CODE § 51 (West 1982). The statute as originally enacted applied to specified
establishments and "all other places of public accommodation or amusement .... " 1897 Cal.
Stat. ch. 108, sec. 1, at 137. In 1959, the legislature substituted "business establishments" for
the previous "public accomodations" language. CAL. Crv. CODE § 51 (West 1982). Subsequent
case law interpreted the change as encompassing the previously enumerated places and continued
to refer to the statute as a public accommodation law. See, e.g., Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co.,
57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962).
8. The Unruh Act reads in pertinent part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or
national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. Civ.
CODE § 51 (West 1982). See Burks, 57 Cal. 2d at 469, 476, 370 P.2d at 316, 320, 20 Cal.
Rptr. at 612, 616 (construction company prohibited from racially discriminating in the sale of
its homes).
9. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1943. Two of the women joined Duarte in bringing suit
against Rotary International. Id.
10. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, No. C 244753 (Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, May 4, 1987).
11. Id.
12. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035,
1055, 1058, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 224, 226 (1986).
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court of appeals held the application of the Unruh Act does not

impermissibly infringe upon the associational rights of Rotary International members.13 The United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the Unruh Act does not violate the first amendment by

requiring the California affiliates of Rotary International to admit
4
women.'
This note examines the approach used by the United States Supreme

Court in deciding that the discriminatory policies of Rotary International are not constitutionally protected by the right of association,
of either a private or expressive nature. Part I discusses the constitutional source of the right of association and previous right of

association challenges to private organizations. Part I also discusses
the scope of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 15 a California public
accommodation law. Part II summarizes the facts of Rotary Internationaland reviews the opinion of the United States Supreme Court.

Finally, Part III of this note explores the effects and legal ramifications of Rotary International on the standards applicable to the
associational rights of members of quasi-public organizations.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
A.

Right of Association

The freedom of association, which includes the choice not to
associate with others, 16 is considered fundamental to the liberty of
every individual. 17 Yet, the right of association is not expressly

13. Id. at 1065, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
14. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 194748 (1987). The Court reviewed the constitutional validity of the Unruh Act by appellate
jurisdiction authorized under title 28 of the United States Code section 1257(2). Id. at 1945,
n.3. The California Supreme Court had declined the petition for review of Rotary International.
Id. at 1945.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (Vest 1982).
16. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977); (compelling
school teachers to support the political purposes of a union "works no less an infringement
of constitutional rights" than prohibiting teachers from supporting the union); Note, Roberts

v. Jaycees: DiscriminatoryMembership Policy of a National OrganizationHeld Not Protected
by First Amendment, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 1055, 1074 (1985) (citing Roberts for the principle
that freedom of association implies a right to not associate).
17. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (freedom of
association is a fundamental element of pesonal liberty); Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights We Have? The Case for Associational Freedom, 10 H~Av. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 101, 111 (1987) (noting followers of Locke may interpret the ninth amendment
as protecting associational freedom as a fundamental right).
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specified as an independent right in the Constitution. 8 Some com-

mentators note that the Constitution secures natural rights, and
include the right of association among these inalienable freedoms. 19
Regardless of the derivation of associational rights, the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court recognize a constitutional right of
association emanating from the first amendment for the effective
exercise of traditional rights of expression 2 and, to a lesser degree,
2
for activities that promote a way of life. '

The United States Supreme Court formally articulated a right of
association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.22 Alabama

sought to enjoin the New York-based NAACP from doing business
in Alabama without first qualifying under the state foreign corpo-

ration statute. 23 The NAACP refused a state discovery request to

divulge the names and addresses of NAACP members and the trial

court consequently issued a contempt order against the NAACP. 24

On review, 2 the United States Supreme Court decided that invol18. See supra note 1. The United States Supreme Court has established a commitment to
rights not enumerated in the Constitution. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482,
484 (1965) (the right of privacy received protection from governmental interference as a
fundamental principle underlying the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments); Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall) 35, 44 (1868) (right to travel recognized as necessary for the effective
exercise of the right to petition the government for grievances). See also Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote).
But cf. Kedroff v. St. Nicolas Cathedral, 341 U.S. 94, 114-16 (1952) (right of association for
religious purposes is unquestionably delineated by the free exercise clause of the first amendment). Discussion of a constitutional right of association under the religions clauses of the
first amendment is beyond the scope of this note.
19. Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 1, 13-14 (1977); Barnett, supra note 17, at 107. See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 491
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (referring to the right of marital association as an unenumerated
fundamental liberty, and as such, protected by the ninth amendment).
20. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) (association for advocacy
purposes derives from the right to peaceably assemble); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429
(1963) (litigation protected as a form of political expression); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (right of association protected because it promotes
expression that the first amendment is designed to foster).
21. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 ("Marriage ... is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions."); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528, 541 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that poor persons congregating in households
is a traditional way to reduce the effects of poverty and is an association that expresses the
right of freedom of association); see also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (freedom of association encompasses right to choose living
companions).
22. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
23. 10 ALA. CODE §§ 192-98 (1940).
24. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 452-54. The NAACP considered itself exempt from the
Alabama foreign corporation statute. Id. at 453.
25. Jurisdiction for review by the United States Supreme Court was based on federal
claims after relief was denied by the Alabama Supreme Court on inadequate non-federal
grounds. Id. at 454-58.
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untary disclosure of the NAACP membership lists would violate the
NAACP members' right of association. The Supreme Court recog-

nized a nexus between a right to associate and first amendment
freedoms of expression. 26 As a form of political group expression,
the advocacy efforts of the NAACP were thus deserving of consti-

tutional protection. Next, the Supreme Court determined that a
review of "the closest scrutiny" is applicable for any state action

that attempts to abridge the freedom of association. 27 Finally, in
applying the close scrutiny standard, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the interest of the state was sufficiently compelling

to justify infringement on the freedom of association of the NAACP.2

The Supreme Court determined that the disclosure requirement was

unrelated to the issue of whether the Alabama foreign corporation
registration statute applied to the NAACP, and reversed the contempt
29
order as a violation of the freedom of association.

In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,30 the United States Supreme Court

observed that the right of every citizen to engage in political association is protected by the first amendment. NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, however, is considered the first decision to recognize

a constitutional freedom of association. 31 In Patterson, the Supreme
Court expressly announced constitutional protection for a group to

assert, and thus secure, the same first amendment rights as the
individual members of the group. 32 Moreover, the United States
26. Id. at 460 (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)).
27. Id. at 460-61. The Court found that the contempt judgment intimidated, in a potentially
unconstitutional manner, the ability of the NAACP to express itself. Id. at 461. Furthermore,
the Court concluded that compelled disclosure would likely impair the effectiveness of the
NAACP based upon an unchallenged showing of past threats and economic sanctions imposed
on known members. Id.
28. Id. at 463-64.
29. Id. at 465-66.
30. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (legislative investigation of subversive activities encroached
upon the constitutional right of association when it sought to compel Mr. Sweezy to disclose
the nature of his association with the Progressive Party).
31. See Note, United States Jaycees v. McClure: Private Organizationsand the Right of
Association-How Far Does ConstitutionalProtection Extend?, 17 CRorroGTN L. REv. 1535,
1543 (1983); Note, Discriminationin Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right
to Privacy, 1970 DtrrE L.J. 1181, 1192 (1970); Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom
of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1964).
32. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 459 (considering the NAACP an extension of the individual
members, a vehicle for enhancing the effectiveness of their expressive activities). Compare
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (interference with political party violates
first amendment political freedom of the individual party members) with Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477 (1975) (national political party asserting constitutional rights of voters of the
Democratic Party) and Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 421 U.S. 995 (1975)
(health maintenance organization unable to assert constitutional rights for its members because
low cost medical care not constitutionally protected).
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Supreme Court suggested that the close scrutiny standard would
apply to review state action impinging on group expression of economic, religious or cultural beliefs.3 3 Thus, the decision expanded the

scope of protected association beyond political expression, to which
Sweezy, the earlier case, was limited. Relying on Patterson, the United
States Supreme Court continued to apply the right of association to
organizations through which individuals sought enhanced expression
34
of first amendment activities.

Individual justices support a principle of exclusion for membership
clubs analogous to the broad protection for privacy in the home.3

Freedom of association may thus be perceived as an affirmative
constitutional defense. 36 The United States Supreme Court, however,
denies affirmative constitutional protection to a right of exclusion,

even at the expense of burdening a protected form of association.3 7
In Railway Mail Association v. Corsi,3" an all-white union asserted

a "right of selectivity" under the fourteenth amendment in an attempt
to exclude non-white postal clerks from union membership. 39 The
United States Supreme Court denied constitutional protection, hold-

ing the union policy was not a fundamental liberty encompassed by

33. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61.
34. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) (litigation protected as a form of
political expression); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) (compulsory
disclosure of membership lists would violate a freedom of association protected by the
fourteenth amendment, as derived from the right to peaceably assemble). See also United Mine
Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (freedom of speech,
assembly and petition give the Union the right to hire salaried attorneys for its members);
Brotherhood R.R. Trailmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964) (rights of
petition and assembly include the right to legal assistance obtained through an association).
35. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);

Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See Burns, The
Exclusion of Women from InfluentialMen's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full
Equality, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321, 345-50 (1983) (analyzing the relationship between
the right to private association, forced associations, and the exclusion of women from the

clubhouse; noting that Justice Goldberg later actively supported the admission of women into
the Cosmos Club of Washington D.C.).
36. Note, Private Club DiscriminationCan Be Outlawed: Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
19 U.S.F. L. REv. 413, 423-24 (1985) (freedom of association is used as an affirmative defense).
37. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (requirement to pay union
dues may interfere with employees' freedom of association to advance ideas or to refrain from
such expressive activities but is constitutionally justified because Congress has determined that
unions are important for labor relations); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976)
(parents have first amendment right to send children to schools that promote segregation, but
that principle does not include a constitutional right to exclude racial minorities from those
schools). See Note, supra note 36, 413-14; Burns, supra note 35, at 348, L. TRIE, supra note
1, at 701.
38. 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
39. Id. at 93.
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the fourteenth amendment 0 Therefore, the constitutional freedom
of association does not necessarily include a right to not associate
4
with others on the basis of race or sex. '
In 1965, however, the United States Supreme Court suggested a
larger scope of the right of association in Griswold v. Connecticut.42
In Griswold, Justice Douglas ascribed the right of association to the
penumbra of the first amendment. 43 Furthermore, Justice Douglas
invoked the safeguard of associational rights in his closing discussion
on marital privacy." Consequently, some authorities view Griswold
as support for the principle of an independent right of association. 45
The United States Supreme Court has developed a bifurcated right
of association to protect two qualitatively different freedoms. Associational freedoms depend on their relationship to liberties encom46
passed intrinsically by, or enumerated in, the Constitution.
Accordingly, groups of individuals may seek enhancement of first
amendment expression by acting through organizations such as the
NAACP. Similarly, the marital association described in Griswold

40. Id. (New York antidiscrimination law upheld against union policy). The Court pointedly observed that the fourteenth amendment was designed to prevent racial discrimination,
not protect a "right of selection." Id. at 93-94.
41. Comment, The Affirmation of State Authority to Prohibit Sex Discrimination in
Public Accomodations, 38 RuTGERs L. REv. 341, 353-56 (1986) (observing that the Supreme
Court rejects a right of exclusion as a form of constitutionally protected association). But cf.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to not associate on the basis of religious beliefs
protected under free exercise clause of first amendment).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id. at 484. Although the primary focus of the case is on a right of privacy derived
from the first, third, and fourth amendments, Justice Douglas refers to prior decisions involving
the freedom of association. Id. at 483-84. Furthermore, Griswold is cited in later cases as an
early application of the right to intimate or private association. See, e.g., Roberts v. United

States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
44. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (reviewing a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of
contraceptives by married couples).
45. See, e.g., Note, supra note 36, at 426 (in the intimate association context, actual
existence of a relationship may confer constitutional protection). Justice Douglas adheres to
the requirement of an expressional purpose in the right of private association in his later
opinions. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (Douglas, J.) (statute
prohibiting the living together of three or more unrelated persons upheld because the statute
did not infringe the ability of individuals to advocate beliefs and ideas); United States Dep't
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (observing that
unrelated individuals express the right of the freedom to associate by forming a household;
denial of foodstamps to household of unrelated persons held unconstitutional).
46. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Raggi, supra note 19, at 26-29 (observing that the right to medical care is not protected by
the Constitution and, therefore, collective health maintenance organization not protected under
freedom of association, whereas group legal practice derives first amendment protection by
link to freedom of speech or petition).
47. See supra, note 32 and accompanying text.
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expresses a "way of life," and married couples promoting familial
purposes are protected by the first amendment. 8 Recently, the two
aspects of the freedom of association were set forth by the Supreme
Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.4 9 In Roberts, the Court
describes the constitutional protection afforded to highly personal relationships as a freedom of intimate association.5 0 The right to associate
with others in the exercise of explicit first amendment activities is
referred to as the freedom of expressive association."
The rights of expressive and intimate association are subject to
5 2
separate standards of review by the United States Supreme Court.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 53 the Supreme Court established that a state
may infringe on the freedom of expressive association only when the
state justifies the interference with a compelling interest.5 4 Further,
the state interest must be one which cannot be achieved through less
restrictive means. 55 In contrast, the freedom of intimate association
is accorded greater constitutional protection because intimate asso56
ciation encompasses the fundamental nature of personal liberty.
Nevertheless, the right to intimate association is limited in scope.
The Supreme Court is unwilling to recognize a right of association
for communal living purposes alone.5 7 Moreover, the Supreme Court
does not extend a right of association to protect unrelated persons
5
from government action upon the formation of an association. 1

48.
49.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).

50. Id. 468 U.S. at 618.
51. Id. See also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct.
1940, 1945 (1987).
52. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
53. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (contribution and expenditure provisions of Federal

Election Campaign Act of 1971 challenged under first amendment).
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 (private relations are given a substantial measure of

sanctuary); Moore v. East Cleveland Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (usual judicial deference
to city ordinances is inappropriate with family relationships); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (unequivocal holding that the state cannot infringe on the freedom of choice to

marry).
57.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20. See also, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1

(1974) (Douglas, J.) (statute prohibiting three or more unrelated persons from living together
upheld because the statute did not infringe the ability of individuals
ideas).
58. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945);
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 U.S. 2841,
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O'Connor,
of private association is unlikely to encompass groups so large that

to advocate beliefs and
Village of Belle Terre v.
2843-44 (1986). See also
J., concurring) (freedom
the "private" aspect of
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B.

Challenges to DiscriminatoryMembership Policies
The purposes of an organization often require selectivity in forming

membership.5 9 Prohibitions against arbitrary discrimination, however,

6 and numerous federal and state
are embodied in the Constitutionw

laws .6 Antidiscrimination litigation in the areas of housing,62 em-

ployment,

3

education,"I and access to commercial establishments,

5

addresses the conflict between associational freedom and equality.
The right of private clubs to discriminate under the auspices of

freedom of association may be challenged on equal protection
grounds66 and on federal or state statutory grounds. 67 Proponents of

equal access to private clubs may successfully contest discrimination

the right would lose all meaning); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1947 n.6 (1987).
59. For example, the American Legion is a social service organization of American naval
military veterans, men and women, open to veterans of World War I. See generally D. AKEY,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS (1984) (listing and describing various associations, from blood
banks to veteran's groups).
60. Section one of the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII, § 1. See also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
61. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 20003 (1982) (creating the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (Fair Housing Act reaches private sex discrimination in
sales, rentals, financing, and brokerage services); CA. EDUC. CODE § 992150 (West 1978) (state
funds cannot be dispensed on behalf of the University of California, or University-sponsored
activities, to private clubs with discriminatory membership policies).
62. Oliver v. Shelly, 538 F. Supp. 600 (D.C. Tex. 1982) (discrimination based on an
individual's association with a person of another race violates federal Fair Housing Act);
United States v. Reece, 457 F. Supp- 43 (D.C. Mont. 1978) (policy of rental property owner
to not rent to single women without cars proscribed by Federal Fair Housing Act).
63. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1983) (right of women lawyer to be
considered for partnership constitutes a privilege of employment covered by Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and does not impinge associational rights of partners of the law firm).
64. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (invidious private discrimination is not
afforded affirmative constitutional protection, albeit parents possess right to educate their
children into bigotry).
65. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973) (recreation
club inviting residents within three mile radius of its swimming pool could not invoke private
club exception when membership was based soley on race).
66. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part:
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause is applicable if the private
action complained of is in essence the action of the government. Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 74-101. See also Burns, supra, note 35, at 269 (for
regulations impinging on constitutional freedoms, courts will weigh the purposes of the statute
against the countervailing interests of the party infringed upon).
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unrelated to the purposes of the organization."' Gender-based chal-

lenges to the membership policies of private organizations often
contend with old stereotypes and mischaracterizations. 9 Furthermore,
the particular elements and exemptions of antidiscrimination laws
present obstacles to legal attacks against the prejudicial membership
70
practices of private organizations.

1.

Equal Protection

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not
applicable to private action, as the Constitution limits only government action. 71 Under equal protection analysis, the courts review
state action for improper and arguably indistinguishable classifications.72 An equivalent guarantee that prohibits unreasonable discrimination by the federal government is implicit in the due process clause

68. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 75, 707 P.2d 212, 214, 219
Cal. Rptr. 150, 152 (1985) (decision that girls be admitted to the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz
not so broad as to include organizations maintaining objectives to which the operation of
facilities is incidental); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 166,
460 P.2d 495, 499, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 627 (1969) (noting reluctance of courts to interfere with
the internal affairs of membership associations, but arbitrary rejection of dentist's application
to professional society justifies judical intervention under common law). See also Note, supra
note 36, at 415 (truly private associations, such as poker games and rare blood groups, are

unlikely to be challenged under antidiscrimination laws because they affect no political, social,
or economic advantage in larger society in the exercise of their organizational purposes); Burns,
supra note 35, at 350-51 (no right to exclusion extends to business or professional associations).
69. See, e.g., Erlinger v. Thomas, 324 F. Supp. 1329, 1332 (D.S.C. 1971) (female denied
right to work as Senate page and told she could receive similar experience by observing the
Senate from the public gallery). See also Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club: Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the Door, 13 Sw. U.L. REv. 237, 244 (1982) (concluding that
judicial review at level of rational basis scrutiny results in perception of sex discrimination
challenges as-trivial); Burns, supra note 35, at 332-46 (implicit in the exclusion of women from
influential men's clubs is the notion that men are superior, and as such, only men should
direct the public sphere of markets and government).
70. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-13 (1883) (state action required for advancing
an equal protection claim); Runyon v. McCrary 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (title 42 of the
United States Code, section 1981, extends constitutional right to make and enforce contracts
to non-whites but inapplicable for sex discrimination); Lee v. Minnock, 417 F. Supp. 436
(D.C. Pa. 1976) (title 42 of the United States Code, section 1982, includes property rights
protected by constitution but sex discrimination not redressable); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (exempts
fraternities, sororities, YMCA, YWCA, Boys Scouts, and Girls Scouts from federal prohibitions
of sex discrimination in federally funded educational activities); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982)
(federal public accommodation law exemption for private clubs not "in fact" open to the
public).
71. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883). The fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution states in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CON T. amend. XIV, § I.
72. Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 755 F.2d 266 (1985) (court
reviewed distinction between residents and non-residents receiving preference points in applying
for state employment), aff'd sub nom. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 858 (1986); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (prospective adopting parent
distinguished on basis of sex under New York adoption laws).
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of the fifth amendment.73 Significant state involvement is required
when invidious discrimination originates with private action. 74 Thus,
discriminatory membership practices of men-only clubs must be intertwined with state action before a denial of equal protection can
be claimed.7 5
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 76 the United States Supreme
Court considered the issue of state action. The bylaws of the Loyal
Order of Moose, of which the local lodge is a member, limits lodge
memberships to white males. 77 The local lodge refused dining room

service to a black male guest of a member in good standing. The
guest sought injunctive relief under federal civil rights law. The
district court invalidated the liquor license of the Lodge, 78 but the
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the state liquor board regulations provided an insufficient nexus between the State and the discriminatory guest practices for equal protection purposes.7 9 Moose
Lodge demonstrates the limitations of equal protection grounds for
individuals confronting association arguments in private settings. s0
2. Federal Statutory Law
The commerce clause empowers Congress to restrict private discrimination affecting interstate commerce. 81 Federal prohibitions en73. Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
74. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1971).
75. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 176. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 64 Cal. 2d 539, 537,
413 P.2d 825, 847 (state regulation perceived as promoting discrimination), aff'd, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952) (state action found
in California judicial enforcement of private discrimination activity), aff'd, 346 U.S. 249
(1953).
76. 407 U.S. 163 (1971).
77. Following the district court ruling of Moose Lodge, the Lodge changed its guest
policies to exclude as guests persons ineligible for membership. Id. at 178.
78. Id. at 168.
79. Id. at 173 (significant state involvement required when the impetus for the invidious
discrimination is private action). The Court found the plaintiff entitled to injunctive relief
under licensing board regulation requiring licensees to comply with by-laws, even racially
discriminating ones. Id. at 171-72. However, in finding sufficient state action for injunctive
relief while allowing guest policies to conform to discriminatory membership policies, the
majority disregards the spirit of the fourteenth amendment while apparently ratifying the
circumvention of the equal protection clause. Cf. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326. U.S. 88,

93-94 (1945) (union chastized by United States Supreme Court for asserting the fourteenth

amendment to protect discriminatory policies).
80. Sex discrimination challenges to the Moose Lodge policies would also have failed
under an equal protection theory. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973)
(Court recognizes the resemblance of gender-based classifications to that of ethnic or racial
minorities, but sex discrimination given less scrutiny than race).
81. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964). See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970) (Equal Pay Act reaches private sex
and race discrimination).
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acted pursuant to the commerce clause regulate private race and sex
discrimination in employment,82 housing, 83 and education. 4 The federal public accommodation law,85 Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, prohibits discrimination which affects interstate commerce or is
supported by state action. 6 While the commerce clause authority is
construed to grant broad regulatory power to Congress, the federal
accommodation law does not extend to sex discrimination." Moreover, the federal public accommodation law specifically exempts clubs
not "in fact" open to the public.88 Thus, federal statutory law
represents a limited avenue for challenges to sex discrimination by
private clubs.
3.

State Statutory Law

State regulations can prevent discrimination indirectly by conditioning receipt of state licenses and tax benefits on non-discriminatory

policies.

9

States may enact laws that implement specific antidiscri-

82. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1983) (Title IX of 1964 Civil Rights Act
covers benefits of employment).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (West 1964) (Fair Housing Act).
84. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (title 42 of the United States Code,
section 1982 prohibits race discrimination in contracts for educational services); 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (West 1976) (Educational Amendments Act, Title IX, prohibits sex discrimination in
federally funded educational activities).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1983) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c) (1983) (operations affecting commerce); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d)
(1983) (support for state action).
87. The federal public accommodation law in Title II provides: "All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1983).
88. The federal public accommodation law exemption reads:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities
of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e).
The specific language of the exemption to the federal public accommodation law has been
attacked. See Kiwanis Club of Great Neck, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis Int'l, 52
A.D. 2d 906, 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387 (1976) (Shapiro, J., dissenting) (objecting to a
definition of private club as one that becomes so by merely barring a portion of the public);
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-99 (1966) (public may not be defined by the proprietor
of a restaurant to include only the people of the proprietor's choice).
89. See, e.g., CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE §§ 23428.20-23428.26 (West 1985) (defines various
"clubs" that are subject to antidiscrimination regulation as liquor licensees, including homeowner associations, cultural exchange organizations, letter carrier unions, and social clubs of
350 or more members after five years existence), Regulations that combat discrimination
indirectly meet with varying success. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Loyal Order of Moose,
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minatory policies by withholding state funds. 90 State9' and city92 public
accommodation laws directly prohibit sex discrimination in restaurants, places of amusement, business establishments, and other public
facilities. 93 Despite legislative concerns for individual equality, courts
are reluctant to undermine the right of association. 94 Many antidis-

crimination laws include exemptions for truly private clubs. 9 However, early abuses of the federal private club exemption led the courts
to define the relevant factors in determining whether a club is truly

private.9" Therefore, in public settings the individual right of equal access
generally outweighs the interests of private proprietors in unrestricted
97
association.

State courts borrow from federal public accommodation law in
defining the parameters of bona fide private clubs. Membership
selectivity, payment of dues, and member participation in selection
procedures are relevant considerations. 9s Courts also regard the commercial nature of an entity as an important factor in determining
the status of private clubs under public accommodation statutes. 9 In

Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 595 A.2d 694 (1972) (racially discriminatory guest policies of
fraternal organization prohibited by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, however, distinctly
private membership policies are outside the scope of the Act).
90. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 92150 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987) (University of California
may not fund memberships or sponsor activities at private clubs with discriminatory membership
policies).
91. Project, Discrimination in Access to Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal
Public Accommodation Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 241-43 (1978) (listing
the public accommodation laws enacted by 38 states). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3)
(West 1982). This state statute provides in pertinent part: "It is an unfair discriminatory
practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of
race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." Id.
92. See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., ORDINANCE 162426 (May 28, 1987).
93. Unlike California, some states also codify the definition of public accommodation.
E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(18) (West 1982) (providing that a publi accommodation
includes "any business facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise
made available to the public.").
94. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D.
Conn. 1974) (Elks Club considered an extension of members' homes and, therefore, withstood
federal public accommodation law challenge); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
176 (1972).
95. Project, supra note 91, at 241-43.
96. See, e.g., Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1151 (S.D. Tx. 1970) (describes
factors for determining private clubs under federal civil rights law). See also Goodwin, supra
note 69, at 267.
97. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (characterizing the interest of a restaurant
proprietor in private or unrestricted association as "slight").
98. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
99. Id. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor advocates a commercial-
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United States Jaycees v. McClure,'0° the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Jaycees, although not strictly private, is a

genuine membership organization rather than a commercial enterprise.101 Thus, the Minnesota public accommodation law unconstitutionally infringed upon the right of association of the Jaycees. 02

The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the Jaycees
decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees 0 3 Since the Jaycees'

activities are substantially open to nonmembers and the membership
is large and unselective, the Supreme Court held that the Jaycees

organization is a commercial entity.'

4

Roberts was the first United States Supreme Court review of the

conflict between the equal access rights of women and the associational rights of a fraternal organization. The United States Jaycees

were subject to the public accommodation laws of Minnesota because
the Jaycees did not fall within the category of highly personal

relationships entitled to protection under the right of intimate association. 05 The response to Roberts was generally restrained, 0 6 perhaps
because the Jaycees are considered aggressive and indiscriminate
recruiters. 1°7 The Roberts decision is limited to associations qualified
as public accommodations under Minnesota law.
4.

CaliforniaPublic Accommodation Law

As early as 1872, the California legislature recognized a common
law duty against discrimination for enterprises providing goods and

expressive dichotomy rather than the intimate/expressive associational review set forth by the
majority).
100. 704 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. grantedsub nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1983).
101. 704 F.2d at 1571.
102. Id. at 1576.
103. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 764 (1981), rev'd sub nom., Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1983).
104. Id. at 620.
105. Id. at 621. The Court deferred to the analysis used by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in determining that the Jaycees were a public accommodation. Id. at 627. See United States
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 764, 774 (1981), rev'd sub nom., Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1983).
106. Note, supra note 36, at 427-28; Abrashkin, Anti-discrimination Law-Sex Discrimination-Freedom of Association-Placesof PublicAccommodation, 70 MAss. L. REv. 97, 9899 (1985); Linder, Freedom of Association after Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MIcH.
L. REv. 1878, 1901 (1984).
107. Linder, supra note 106, at 1901. Significantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court excluded
the Kiwanis International organization from the scope of the Minnesota public accommodation
law. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W. 2d 764, 771 (1981), rev'd sub nom., Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1983). Rotary clubs, on the other hand, are arguably
more selective than the Jaycees because Rotarians use a "classification system" to determine
membership. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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services to the public. 08 The California state legislature first enacted
a public accommodation law in 1897.109 The statute listed places of
public accommodation, including hotels, restaurants, skating rinks
and public conveyances. 110 In 1955, however, the California Court
of Appeals limited the state public accommodation law by upholding

a white-only burial policy in Long v. Mountain View Cemetery."'
In cases following the Long decision, private schools, 12 dentist
offices" 3 and publicly advertised gymnasiums" 4 were held to be

outside the racial prohibitions of the California public accommodation law. These constrictive judicial efforts led to the enactment of
the Unruh Civil Rights Act'15 in 1959.116 As an amendment to the

existing law, the Unruh Act declared all citizens of California free
and equal, and prohibited race discrimination in all business estab117
lishments.
The Unruh Civil Rights Act is framed in terms of the business

nature of an establishment. In Burks v. Poppy Construction Co.," 8
the California Supreme Court considered whether the on-site sale of
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 365 (West 1970) (misdemeanor criminal offense for innkeepers
or common carriers to discriminate without just cause). See also Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels,
73 Cal. App. 3d 152, 156, 140 Cal. Rptr. 599, 603 (1977) (common law duty on innkeepers
assures travelers will be received on equal basis).
109. 1897 Cal. Stat. ch. 108, sec. 1, at 137 (prohibits discrimination in "all places of
public accommodation" with an illustrative listing of establishments).
110. Id. See Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in "Business Establishments"
Statutes-A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 260, 263 (1960).
111. 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 329, 278 P.2d 945, 946 (1955).
112. Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d 887, 890, 338 P.2d 633,
636 (1959).
113. Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 833, 834-35, 305 P.2d 1020, 1021-22 (1957).
114. Gardner v. Vic Tanney's Compton Inc., 182 Cal. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1960).
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
116. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 214, 474 P.2d 992, 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1970) (noting
that the 1959 Unruh provisions were prompted by court decisions which improperly curtailed
the scope of the public accommodation law). See also Cooley, Civil Actions for Damages
Arising Out of Violations of Civil Rights, 17 HAsTiNGS L.J. 189, 191 (1965) (discussing Tanney
decision). The California Supreme Court protected equality interests in employment before the
legislature codified antidiscrimination policy in the California Labor Code in 1959. James v.
Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 731-32, 155 P.2d 329, 335 (1944) (union obligated by
common law duty to charge reasonable rates because unions create monopoly of employment).
See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12940 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) (Fair Employment & Housing
Act prohibits race discrimination by private persons in housing and hiring; replaces California
Labor Code section 1420 under which unlawful employment practices were amended in 1970
to include sex discrimination (West 1971 & Supp. 1987)); Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment
and Housing Commission, 56 U.S.L.W. 3209 (United States Supreme Court let stand a finding
that gender is not a bona fide occupational qualification for jobs at Bohemian social functions).
117. The Unruh Act reads in pertinent part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this
state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or
national origin are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." CAL. Cirv.
CODE § 51 (West 1982).
118. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313 (1962).
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tract homes constitutes a business establishment. The court deter-

mined that the Unruh Act covers businesses at fixed locations and
all permanent commercial forces or organizations." 19 The California
courts continue to broadly construe the 1959 language, "business
establishments of every kind whatsoever," without restricting the
reach of the statute to places specified in the original public accom120
modation statute.
The Unruh Act is not limited to profit-making enterprises. Unlike
California housing and employment antidiscrimination laws,' 2' which
exempt nonprofit groups, the Unruh Act does not contain any
exemptions. In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association,22 a
nonprofit homeowners organization was held to be within the scope
of the Act.'2 Thus, all public and private associations determined to
constitute business establishments are prohibited from arbitrarily
discriminating under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.'1
In 1974, the California legislature specifically amended the provisions of the Unruh Act to cover gender-based discrimination. 125 Prior
to the amendment, the California Court of Appeals interpreted the
statutory language as illustrative, rather than exhaustive, 26 of dis-

119. Id. at 468, 370 P.2d at 316. See also Horowitz, supra note 110, at 287 (anticipating
the term "establishments" to include "nonphysically located" enterprises).
120. Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d 125, 128, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20, 21 (1976) (Unruh
Act to be construed liberally to meet policy objectives; black plaintiffs discrimination claim
against mobile homes operator held actionable); Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d
721, 731, 640 P.2d 115, 123, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 505 (1982) (Unruh Act not reserved for
restricted categories; no children policy at apartment complex violated Unruh Act).
121. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12926(c) (West 1980) ("employer" under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act does not include non-profit or religious associations), 12927(d) (exemption
for housing accommodations of non-profit religious, fraternal, charitable associations).
122. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal Rptr. 320 (1983).
123. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324. See also Curran v. Mount Diablo
Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 730, 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 338
(1983) (insufficient business-like attributes for Boy Scouts to be covered by the Unruh Act);
Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 81, 707 P.2d 212, 217, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 150, 155 (1985) (recreational facilities of a public, non-selective organization, held to be
within the Unruh provisions).
124. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 84 n.14, 707 P.2d at 220 n.14, 219 Cal. Rptr at 158 n.14
(Boys' Club is within the Unruh Act but the statute does not govern strictly private relationships
which take place outside public view). The California Supreme Court did not decide whether
all non-selective associations that may be open to the public are within the scope of the Unruh
Act. Id. at 81 n.8, 707 P.2d at 217 n.8, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 155 n.8. Arbitrary discrimination
probably does not include specialized facilities that serve unique needs as a matter of wellsettled public policy, e.g., retirement homes. Id. at 88, 707 P.2d at 222-23, 219 Cal Rptr. at
160-61. (citing language from Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 741, 640 P.2d
115, 128-29, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 509-10 (1982)).
125. 1974 Cal. Stat. ch. 1193, sec. 1, at 2568 (amending CAL. Cry. CODE § 51 (West 1982))
("sex" added to enumerated classifications)).
126. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 474 P.2d 992, 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 27 (1970) (Unruh
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criminatory classifications. Courts note that the Unruh Act is, for

California, the primary safeguard against arbitrary discrimination in
places of public accommodation.

127

In California, gender is considered

an invidious classification within the scope of constitutional antidiscrimination law.' 28 Arguably, the 1974 amendment did not expand
the reach of the statute, since29discrimination based solely on gender

may be considered arbitrary.
In Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 1 ° the California
Supreme Court confirmed the comprehensive antidiscrimination policy of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The court observed that the Boys'
Club members pay a nominal fee and exercise no control over
membership and operating affairs. 13 ' As a community recreation
facility, the Boys' Club comprises a "classically" public place of
amusement,' 32 for which members cannot claim a right of intimate
association. 31 Moreover, the application of the Unruh Act to the
Boys' Club does not restrain protected expressive activities in any
unconstitutionally intrusive fashion, because admitting girls does not
affect the operations of the Club.134 The Unruh Civil Rights Act
continues to be one which prohibits all arbitrary exclusions of entire
classes that are based on sterotypical notions.'3 5 In Board of Directors
of Rotary Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court interpretation
of the state public accommodation law.
Act discrimination categories are indicia of prohibited conduct rather than restrictive classifications). See also Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d 72, 86-87, 707 P. 2d 212, 221-22, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150,
159-60 (1985).
127. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 75, 707 P.2d at 214, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152; Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 733, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 338 (1983).
128. Sailer Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d. 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 540-41, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 34041 (1971) (sex is a suspect class because of immutability; court recognized stigma which
underlies all suspect classes).
129. See Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 86- 87, 707 P.2d 212,
221-22, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 159-60 (1985) (discussion of amendment history, suggesting "sex"
only illustrates one more irrational basis for arbitrary discrimination).
130. 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
131. Id. at 76, 707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
132. Id. at 81, 707 P.2d at 217, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
133. Id. at 84, 707 P.2d at 220, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
134. Id. at 85-86, 707 P.2d at 220-21, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 158-59. The primary purpose of
the Boys' Club was to combat juvenile delinquency in boys. Id. at 88, 707 P.2d at 223, 219
Cal. Rptr. at 161. The court declined to find that the Club's advantages and privileges were
unsuitable for girls or that participation by girls would "dilute" the Club's efforts. Id. at 89,
707 P.2d at 223, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The Boys' Club, therefore, did not meet the exception,
based on public policies, set forth in Marina Point. See discussion supra note 124.
135. But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1983) (Title II of the federal public accommodation law
limits its prohibitions to the classifications specified in the statute and does not cover sex
discrimination).
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Tm CASE

A.

The Facts and ProceduralBackground

Rotary International was founded in 1905 to develop an "ideal of
service.' ' 3 6 The membership of Rotary International is comprised of
Rotary Clubs worldwide. Through the local affiliates, Rotary International encourages fellowship, high ethical business standards, and
strives to advance international understanding and goodwill.' 3 7 Individuals hold membership through the local Rotary Clubs. 38 Each
rotarian is obliged to apply the Rotary ideal of service to his personal,
business and community life. 39
The standard Rotary Club constitution declares that only men may
become members. 14 Each member shares the responsibility of seeking
eligible new members in the area served by his club. Admission
procedures involve a "classification system" based on occupational
categories.' 41 A classification committee for each club compiles a list
of filled and unfilled categories from an annual survey of the
community in which the club is operating. 42 A proposed active
member is reviewed by the classification committee for eligibility and
by a membership committee to ensure strength of character.' 43 Each
business or professional classification is represented by one active
member, who becomes the holder of the classification. 44 The system
generally ensures broad representation from reputable businesses,
professions, and institutions active in the community. Each club may
adopt individual admission procedures, subject only to the classification system.
In 1977, the Rotary Club of Duarte admitted three women in
defiance of the prohibition in the Rotary Constitution. As a result,

136. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, art. III (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
137. Id.
138. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1942 (1987).
Memberships in local Rotary Clubs totaled approximately 907,750 men at the time the suit
was filed by the Rotary Club of Duarte, one of 19,788 affiliates. Id.
139. STANDARD ROTARY CLUB CoNsTrTrunoN, art. III.
140. CoNsrrtruoN oF ROTARY ITRNATiONAL, art. IV, § 3(a) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
141. Standard Rotary Club Constitution, art. V, § 2.
142. Standard Rotary Club By-laws, art. VIII, § 1(b) (on file at the PacificLaw Journal).
143. Standard Rotary Club By-laws, art. XI, § 1(2) (membership committee charged with
investigating reputable character and business and social standing of all prospective members).
144. Co srrtToN oF ROTARY INTERNATioNAL, art. IV, § 3(b).
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Rotary International revoked the charter of the Duarte club. After
an unsuccessful internal appeal, Duarte filed suit to enjoin Rotary
International from enforcing the gender-discriminatory policies. 145
The Duarte club also sought declaratory relief under the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, contending that Rotary International and the local clubs
are business establishments prohibited from engaging in sex discrimination. 46
The state trial court determined that neither Rotary International
nor the Duarte Club is a business establishment for purposes of the
Unruh Act. 47 Considering the legislative history of the Unruh Act,
the business attributes of Rotary International, and the public characteristics of Duarte, the California Court of Appeals reversed.14
The appellate court first observed that non-profit organizations and
Boy Scouts are considered business establishments under the Unruh
Act. 49 The court then reviewed the complex organizational structure
of Rotary International. The central office in Evanston, Illinois
publishes magazines and audiovisual programs, coordinates public
relations, supervises worldwide fiscal operations, and performs other
administrative services.' 50 The local clubs sell items produced by
Rotary International, such as directories and emblems, collect dues,
and offer commercial services and leadership training.'5 Because
services and goods constitute business advantages for the purposes
of the Unruh Act, the California Court of Appeals held that Rotary
International and the local clubs are business establishments.5 2 The
court further held that rotarian membership does not give rise to a
private relationship protected by the first amendment. 5 3 The appellate
court relied on Roberts to conclude that application of the Unruh
Act does not significantly interfere with the members' expressive

rights. '54
145. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, No. C 244753 (Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, May 4, 1987).
146. Id.
147. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1944 (1987).
148. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035,
1057-58, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 222-24 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
149. Rotary Club of Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1055, 1058, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
150. Id. at 1052-53, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.

151. Id. at 1054, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
152. Id. at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The rotary name came from the rotation of
meetings from one member's place of business to the next, a system designed to share
vocational interests and promote the business of individual members. Id. at 1055, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 224.
153. Id. at 1065, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
154. Id.
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The California Supreme Court denied petition for review,' 55 and
Rotary International appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
First, Rotary International argued that the men-only membership
policy is protected by the first amendment. Second, Rotary International asserted that the Unruh Act is unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. The United States Supreme Court limited review to the
issue of whether the Unruh Act, as applied to Rotary International
and the member clubs, violated the first amendment freedom of
association. 156
B.

The Opinion
Rotary International claimed that the fellowship enjoyed by male
members is protected by a constitutional right of association. 57 In
addition, Rotary International asserted that the men-only policies
permitted foreign affiliates to function effectively. 58 Duarte and two
female members of the Duarte Club contended that Duarte is entitled
to admit women to membership under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 5 9
The United States Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction over the
constitutional validity of the Unruh Act as applied. ' 6 The Supreme
Court proceeded to review the freedom of association claims of
Rotary International, adopting the approach used in Roberts v.
6
United States Jaycees.' '
1. Freedom of PrivateAssociation
In Rotary International,Justice Powell employed the term "private
association" 16 2 to embrace the constitutional right of intimate association previously enunciated in Roberts. 63 The freedom of private

155. Rotary Int'l, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 1945 (1987).
156.

Id. at 1948. The Court did not review the contentions of vagueness and overbreadth

because Rotary International had failed to assert those issues in the California courts. Id.
157. Id. at 1943.

158. Id. Presumably, Rotary International perceives its operations in foreign countries to
be dependent on male-only policies for their effectiveness. See Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board
of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1046, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 231-32 (1986)

(appellate court reversed trial court holding that to preclude the enforcement of Rotary
International's policies would materially affect Rotary operations in foreign countries), aff'd
Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
159. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1943.
160. Id. at 1943 n.3.
161. Id. at 1945.
162. Id.
163. 468 U.S. 609 (1983).
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association protects certain intimate or private relationships against
undue governmental interference.16 The Supreme Court considers
objective characteristics in deciding whether the state can restrict
rights of private association. 65 In Rotary International,the Supreme
Court limited review of private associational rights to those of the
1 66
Duarte Club, as asserted by the international parent organization.
Rotary International, the Supreme Court noted, is a worldwide
corporation comprised of over 19,000 Rotary clubs.16 7 The Court
unequivocally concluded that Rotary International had no claim to
constitutional protection under a right of private association.16 8
The United States Supreme Court used the factors in Roberts to
assess whether the personal association among local Rotary members
warranted constitutional protection. The factors adopted from Roberts include the size, purposes, selectivity and exclusivity of the
association. 69 Rotary club membership procedures emphasize full
representation of the business and professional community.1 70 Although admission is limited to one active member per class, "senior
active" and "past service" memberships -are not limited, and certain
classifications have no limit on active members.' 7' Rotary Club members are instructed to encourage all eligible prospective members to
join.1 72 The Supreme Court stated that the Rotary service activities
benefit the businesses of individual members, but the activities attend
public purposes rather than private relationships. 73 Moreover, Rotary
Clubs seek publicity and participate jointly in activities with other
organizations. The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that application of the Unruh Act to Rotary Clubs did not 74unduly infringe
upon the members' freedom of private association.1
164. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1945. See supra text accompanying notes 35-58
(discussion on the development of the right of private association).
165. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1946; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620
(1984).
166. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1945 n.4. See also note 32, supra and accompanying text.
167. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1942-43.
168. Id. at 1945 n.4.
169. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21.
170. The actual membership of local clubs is unlimited. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1946.

171.

STA DARD RoTARY CLUB CoNsrMrTON, art. V, § 3 (no limitations on number of

active members to represent religion, news media, and diplomatic services); By-laws of Rotary
International, art. III, §§ 4, 5 (any number of senior active and past service members may
qualify into membership and do not represent particular classifications).
172. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1946 (citing 1 Rotary Basic Library, Focus on Rotary 6061, App. 84).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1947.
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2. Freedom of Expressive Association
Recognizing an implicit expressive association as a means of preserving other individual liberties, 75 the Supreme Court reviewed the
second aspect of the right of association claimed by Rotary International for its members.176 Freedom of association is not an absolute
right; rather, the court will weigh against a claim of expressive
77
associational rights the interests which the State chooses to assert,'
State regulations may limit the right of association when the regu78
lations are unrelated to the suppression of ideas.1
The United States Supreme Court first observed that the nature
of rotarian activities circumscribes the extent of Rotary International's expressive associational rights. 179 The Supreme Court noted that
the "foreign effectiveness" argument' 80 of Rotary International is
inapplicable, because the legal effect of the appellate court decision
was limited to California. 18' Furthermore, Rotary Clubs do not
promote or endorse controversial public issues or political topics,
traditional first amendment speech areas. 182 Therefore, the United
States Supreme Court focused on rotarian community service activities, which are protected by the first amendment.
The Unruh Act is applied without regard to the particular viewpoints of the business establishment being regulated.'83 The United
States Supreme Court found that admitting women pursuant to the
Unruh Act did not require alterations in the activities or membership
system of the Rotary clubs. 8 4 Women already attend various Rotary
activities, and the Court pointed out that in accepting women community leaders as members, Rotary clubs would further the representational purposes of the classification system.8 5 The Supreme
Court found that the state interest in eliminating discrimination
against women extended to equal access of leadership skills, business
175. The type of expressive activities is immaterial. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984); NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-09, 932-33
(1982) (right of association extends to wide variety of cultural and social ends).
176. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
177. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 25 (1976).
178. Id.
179. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1945 n.4.
180. Id. at 1943. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
181. Id. at 1940.
182. STANDAu ROTARY CLUB CONSTrrUTION, art. IX.
183. Id. at 1948.
184. Id. at 1947.
185. Id.
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opportunites, and tangible goods and services. 86 Furthermore, public
accommodation laws are an appropriate means with which to serve
antidiscrimination policies.18 7 The Supreme Court concluded that the
compelling interest of the state outweighed any insignificant infringement upon the Rotary Clubs' rights of expressive association.' 8 8
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

In contrast to tried and failed constitutional approaches, state
statutory schemes offer apparently successful theories in eradicating
sex discrimination. In Rotary International, the United States Supreme Court tested the public accommodation law of California
against the conflicting constitutional freedom of association asserted
by a non-profit service organization. The Rotary International decision potentially affects two areas of law. First, the constitutional
analysis of the right of association is likely to continue to require
separate review of private and expressive aspects of the right. In
Rotary International,the Supreme Court affirmed the utility of the
private-expressive dichotomy of associational rights but did not establish new law in the area. Second, the authority of states to
eliminate sex discrimination through public accommodation law,
though burdening first amendment rights, is confirmed. The Supreme
Court did not consider the extent to which the right of association
exists as an independent right for clubs in the absence of public
accommodation regulation. 8 9 Therefore, the holding of Rotary International is limited to the effect on the associational activities
regulated by the challenged antidiscrimination law.
A.

Freedom of Association

Not all government interference with internal policies of a service
organization will violate the first amendment. The opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Rotary International suggests that
the vitality of the right of private association depends on the nature
of the organization.' 90 The Supreme Court indicates that a right to

186. Id. at 1948. See also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984)
(leadership skills are "goods," business contacts are advantages and job promotions are
privileges for purposes of public accommodation law).
187. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1948.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1947 n.6.
190. Id. at 1945-46.
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private association cannot be asserted except in highly personal
relations. 9 ' Significantly, Justice Powell abandons the use of the
term "intimate association" and specifically states that the right of
private association is not limited to family relations. 92 The Court
recognizes a spectrum of personal attachments, rather than a threshold to which the freedom of association may apply. 93 The worldwide
Rotary International organization exemplifies the most attenuated of
personal relations and is, therefore, not afforded constitutional protection under the right of private association.
Individual decisions to enter relationships within the Duarte Club
were not entitled to constitutional protection when the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the inclusive membership policies and public
activities of the Duarte Club. Using the factors set forth in Robertsy'4
both Rotary International and Duarte were considered by the California Court of Appeals to be business establishments under the
Unruh Civil Rights Act. 195 In assessing the private or public status
of the Rotary associations, however, the United States Supreme Court
used objective characteristics which may not be applicable for first
amendment purposes beyond the scope of public accommodation
laws. 196
State governments may restrict expressive associational rights to
further compelling interests of the state, provided the regulations are
unrelated to the suppression of ideas. 19 7 Indicating that the expressive
associational rights of Rotary International were only slightly infringed upon, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the
burden is on the association to demonstrate significant interference
with expressive activities when the challenged law is applied. 98 In
contrast to previous freedom of association cases, 19 9 the Supreme
191. Id.
192. Compare Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1983) (Justice Brennan

implies that constitutional protection is limited to those personal affiliations that attend the
creation and sustenance of a family) with Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1946 (1987) (the Court
states it has not yet limited the right of private association to family relations).
193. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1946.

194. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620 (factors for determining right to private association include
size, organizational purposes, and membership selectivity and exclusivity).
195. Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035,
1055, 1058 (1986).
196. See infra note 214 and accompanying text (legislation pending in California legislature
would bar state tax deductions for business expenses at discriminatory clubs).
197. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1948 (noting that Rotary clubs are uninvolved in the tradi-

tionally favored area of political speech). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
198. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1947.
199. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 72-73 (1976); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
626 (1984).
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Court did not discuss whether the application of the Unruh Act to
Rotary clubs was the least restrictive means of advancing the interest
of the state. The Supreme Court did hold that eradication of gender
discrimination is a compelling state interest. 2°° Therefore, the Court
may be acknowledging that indirect or less restrictive means insufficiently advance state antidiscrimination policy. Stronger first amendment claims than presented in Rotary International, however, may
outweigh a government interest in eliminating gender discrimina20
tion. '
The holding of Rotary International is consistent with previous
cases that decline to affirmatively protect expressive activities which
20 2 In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,20
are based on irrational stereotypes.
a case similar to Rotary Internationalin many respects, the Jaycees
argued that women view public issues differently than men and that,
therefore, the philosophy of the organization would change if women
were allowed to become voting members. 20 4 Justice Brennan, writing
for the Court in Roberts, reiterated previous condemnations of cases
20 5
based on unsupported generalizations of entire classes of people.
Since the expressive activities of Rotary International are more limited
than the Jaycees, 206 Rotary International was imprudent in relying
on the "sense of fellowship" for its right of association claim.
Rotary International establishes no new law in the freedom of
association area. For challenges under the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
however, Rotary Internationaleffectively removes organizations with
business-like attributes from the spectrum of associational rights for
which constitutional protection is afforded. California courts are
likely to continue using the dual approach of Rotary International
20 7
in analyzing freedom of association issues.

200. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1948.
201. Isbister v. Boys Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 84 n.14, 707 P.2d 212, 220
n.14, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 158 n.14 (1985) (specialized facilities that serve unique needs as a
matter of well-settled public policy, e.g., retirement homes, may fall outside scope of public
accomodation law). See Goodwin, supra note 69 (lengthy discussion of what constitutes a truly
private club).
202. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Isbister 40 Cal. 3d at 84, 707 P.2d at
220, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 158 (1985); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
203. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
204. Id. at 628 (1984) (declining to accept Jaycees' stereotype about women's attitudes
regarding federal budget, voting rights, and foreign relations as basis for decision).
205. Id.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 179-88.
207. See, e.g., Isbister, 40 Cal. App. 3d 72, 84, 707 P.2d 212, 220, 217 Cal. Rptr. 150,
158. (1985); Schmidt v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. Rptr. 840, review granted, 218 Cal. Rptr.
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B.

Gender-basedAntidiscriminationLegislation
Rotary International firmly establishes the use of public accom-

modation laws to combat gender-based discrimination in private
organizations. 203 The Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination in "business establishments of every kind whatsoever,"
and is therefore unique among public accommodation laws. 2 9 The
United States Supreme Court in Rotary Internationalspecifically held
that application of the Unruh Act to a nonprofit service organization

does not violate the first amendment. 210 Therefore, the expansive

phrase utilized by the California legislature is a legitimate and func-

tional definition of a place in which antidiscrimination policy may
operate.

The holding of Rotary Internationaldemonstrates a judicial awareness and sensitivity to the changing role of women in our society. 2 'I
Rotary Internationalis part of a growing list of cases in which the

courts recognize that associational discrimination is often arbitrary
or based on criteria unrelated to the organizational purposes of
private groups.2 1 2 The quasi-public nature of organizations such as the

Jaycees and Rotary clubs will continue to be scrutinized for factors
that do not justify constitutional protection for exclusionary policies.
For example, in Rotary Internationalthe purposes of the membership
selection and occupation classification system were found not unimpaired but furthered by the inclusion of women leaders. 2 13

The United States Supreme Court emphasized the appropriateness
of public accommodation law for restricting discrimination. Critical
to the authority of the state, by analogy to federal public accom-

modation law based on the commerce clause, is the public nature of
303, 705 P.2d 876 (1987) (residents suing to overturn a mobile home park age limitation relied
on Rotary Int'l for factors supportive of their private associational rights).
208. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1948 (public accommodation laws serve state interests of
the "highest order").
209. Project, supra note 91 at 241-43.
210. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
211. There was no dissent to the 7-0 opinion of Rotary International.Id. at 1942. Justice
Scalia filed a statement of concurrence. Id. Justice Blackmun and the husband of Justice
O'Connor are honary rotary club members; neither Justice Blackmun or Justice O'Connor
participated in the opinion. Wall St. J., May 5, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
212. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973)
(recreation club prevented from invoking private club exception when membership was based
solely on race); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (law firm partner position
considered a privilege of employment for which employer firms must consider men and women
on an equal basis).
213. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1947 (1987).
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certain establishments. The State of California demonstrated a compelling interest in promoting the substantive right to equal opportunities in public accommodations. Nevertheless, the value of the case
in other areas of regulation remains unclear because the Supreme
Court declined to identify, beyond family relationships, the specific
kinds of selectivity accorded constitutional protection. For example,
the right to apply for a liquor license may be upheld for truly private
clubs, because the interests of the state may be less compelling outside
the area of public accommodations. 214 Tax exemptions such as business deductions, on the other hand, constitute a public subsidy and
thus may subject discriminatory clubs to antidiscrimination legislation. 21 In Rotary International, the Supreme Court establishes only
the type of arguments that will not advance a right of selectivity and
does not indicate what kinds of interests will protect exclusionary
policies.
CONCLUSION

This note first examined the constitutional source of the right of
association and the various theories, including public accommodation
laws, used in previous challenges to discriminatory membership policies of private organizations. In Board of Directors of Rotary
Internationalv. Rotary Club of Duarte, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the Unruh Civil Rights Act as applied
to a non-profit service organization. 216 The California public accommodation law did not impermissibly infringe the freedom of association rights of Rotary club members. Private men-only organizations
affecting a public interest will need to restructure their policies to
avoid allegations of sex discrimination. Conversely, a determination
214. In 1987, California Assembly Bill 2187 would have banned the renewal or use of
liquor licenses in discriminatory clubs, and was held over from the 1987 session by the
California assembly for review in 1988; efforts to pass similar bills in California have been
unsucccessful since 1975. L.A. Daily Journal, Legal GroupsPush ForBias Action On Bohemian
Club, July 2, 1987, at 1, col. 4 (California Assembly Bill 2187 was held over from the 1987
session by the California legislature for review in 1988). See also L.A. Daily Journal, Exclusive
Clubs Pushed to Change, April 13, 1987, at 1, col. 2 (Franchise Tax Board deputy noting
that while members may forego deductions and maintain memberships, losing liquor licenses
strikes "right at the heart" of club functions).
(amending CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
215. See 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1463, secs. 1-3, at § 23438 and CAL. REv. & TAx CODE §§ 17269, 24343.2) (new legislation that bars state tax
deductions for business expenses at private clubs that discriminate against women and minorities); L.A. Daily Journal, Exclusive Clubs Pushed to Change, April 13, 1987, at I, col. 2
(noting that the very people excluded from discriminatory clubs must "turn around and pay
for them").
216. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1947-48.
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that an organization is distinctly private will preclude application of
the California public accommodation law.
Part III of this note discussed the legal impact of Rotary International in prohibiting sex discrimination in quasi-public organizations. Rotary Internationalspecifically defined the reach of compelling
state interests to include the opportunity for women to develop
leadership skills and business contacts. 217 Cities in California have
passed or are considering local ordinances which deny benefits to
large discriminatory clubs in order to serve the local interest in
eradicating sex discrimination.218 The decision in Rotary International
has also sparked voluntary abandonment of discriminatory membership policies of men-only service organizations.2 19 By rejecting the
freedom of association claims of the Rotary International organization, the United States Supreme Court affirms the long standing

interest of the State of California in eliminating arbitrary discrimination in places of public accommodation.
Lisa Tarin Pompa

217. Id. at 1948.
218. See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., ORDINANCE 162426 (May 28, 1987) (prohibits discrimination by clubs or organizations "where business is frequently conducted" and which are
"not distinctly private," i.e. "any organization, institution, club or place of public accommodation" which has 400 or more members, provides regular meal service under contract with
another, and regularly accepts payment from non-members for expenses incurred at the club
in furtherance of trade or business). A similar ordinance in New York City is currently
scheduled for review by the United States Supreme Court. L.A. Daily Journal, October 6,
1987, at 1, col. 6. The Supreme Court may thus further distinguish the characteristics of clubs
whose members cannot assert a right of private association, and may reaffirm the compelling
interests of local governments in eliminating discrimination against women and minorities. In
reviewing the New York City ordinance, the Court may also consider a commercial-expressive

dichotomy of the right of association as advocated by Justice O'Connor, who participated in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees but not Rotary International.
219. Santa Barbara News Press, July 5, 1987, at 5, col. 1 (Lions Club International lifts
ban on female members); L.A. Times, June 2, 1987, § 2 at 1, col. 1 (California Club announces
by-laws change to admit women as regular members; Jonathan Club approves similar change
by four to one margin); Progress Bulletin, June 26, 1987, § B, at 1, col. 3 (Montclair Kiwanis
Club debates admitting women).
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